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19 Research on intuition using intuition 
Viktor Dörfler and Colin Eden 
 
About a century ago Henri Bergson (1911, 1946) argued that intuition is a necessary component 
of philosophical inquiry, and indeed of any enterprise that seeks to understand a complex 
thought. To us, it therefore makes sensHWKDWLQ%HUJVRQ¶VIUDPHZRUNLQWXLWLRQLVQHFHVVDU\
for researching intuition. Like Bergson, we do not suggest that now we should start using 
intuition in our research ± rather, we suggest that we acknowledge that we have always been 
using it. Of course, this is an argument with hindsight, based on experiences from our empirical 
study of Nobel Laureates (NLs). 
In this research project, underlying the methodological argument presented here, we 
conducted unstructured interviews with a set of individuals who would be acknowledged as 
exSHUWVE\WKHµZRUOGDWODUJH¶: those awarded the highest accolade of the Nobel Prize.1 We 
were not explicitly aiming at exploring the intuition of NLs, but more generally their cognitive 
complexity. From this inquiry, LQWXLWLRQKDVHPHUJHGDVDVLJQLILFDQWFKDUDFWHULVWLFRIWKH1/V¶
thinking. It is of particular interest that, although we have not decided ex ante on an intuitive 
approach, it emerged naturally as we were trying to make sense of the interviews. Based on 
this inquiry, we seek WR UHYLYH %HUJVRQ¶V interest in intuiting, and argue for the renewed 
importance of intuition as a method in academic research in the field of management and 
organizations. 
                                                     
1
 We have been focusing on people obtaining the highest prize in their respective professions; 17 out of the 19 
interviewees were Nobel Laureates but there have also been two computer scientists who have been awarded the 
Eckert-Mauchly prize. For simplicity, when referring to all our interviewees, we call them Nobel Laureates. 
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In this chapter we use the term intuition in a broad sense, what, based on Behling and Eckel 
(1991) and Osbeck (2001), Sinclair (2011) describes as µdirect knowing¶. Vaughan (1979) 
explains this view of intuition in terms of knowing without knowing how, or, in the spirit of 
$JRU¶V (1986) view, knowing for sure without knowing for certain. In a sense, this is the 
HVVHQFHRIWKHFRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQRILQWXLWLRQDVµGLUHFWNQRZLQJ¶± knowledge is not arrived at 
by the analytical step-by-step methods usual in the academic publications and, at the time when 
it is obtained, there is no evidence of it being right. 
In what follows we first present a brief overview of what the scholarly literature on 
management and organizations has to say about the intuiting of practising managers. Then, we 
UHYLVLWVFLHQWLVWV¶LQWXLWLQJSDUWO\EDVHGRQOLWHUDWXUHIURPKLVWRU\DQGSKLORVRSK\RIVFLHQFH
and partly using example quotes from the interviews in the NL project. This outline begs the 
question: if intuition is accepted in the case of practising managers and of scientists, why it is 
not accepted in the case of scholars who are studying the intuition of those managers and 
scientists? Thus, we continue our chapter by offering some tentative answers to this question, 
with the aim of being thought-provoking and so prompting further discussion. Finally, we 
present our methodological approach, which explicitly incorporates intuition rather than 
denying it. 
 
INTUITION OF MANAGERS 
In the literature on management and organizations it was Chester Barnard (1938: 291) who 
first assigned crucial importance to the intuition of executives, and argued that intuition is 
µnowhere more indispensable than in executive arts¶. In spite of the large number of studies 
reporting on the intuition of practising managers (e.g., Dean & Mihalasky, 1974; Ford, 1977; 
Isenberg, 1984; Mintzberg, 1976; Peters & Waterman, 1982) and a couple of µwake-up calls¶ 
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emphasizing the importance of the topic (e.g., Isaack, 1978; Leavitt, 1975; Simon, 1987), the 
notion of intuition was not fully explored systematically in the mainstream academic literature 
on management and organizations until recently (e.g., Akinci & Sadler-Smith, 2012; Dane & 
Pratt, 2007, 2009; Gore & Sadler-Smith, 2011; Hodgkinson et al., 2008, 2009; Kahneman, 
2003; Sinclair & Ashkanasy, 2005). 
This recent rejuvenation of interest in intuition in the academic literature on management 
and organizations has not yet resulted in a unified framework (Sinclair, 2011). However, there 
is substantial agreement about the fundamental features of intuition (e.g., Dane & Pratt, 2007; 
Kahneman, 2003: 698; Sadler-Smith, 2008: 13). Three of these features apply to the process of 
intuiting and three to the outcome of such a process ± the intuitive knowledge. Intuiting is rapid 
(often labelled instantaneous), spontaneous (does not require effort and cannot be deliberately 
controlled) and alogical (meaning that it does not necessarily contradict the rules of logic but 
also does not follow them). The outcome of the intuitive process is tacit (in that intuitors cannot 
give an account of how they arrived at the results), holistic (also often called gestalt as it is 
concerned with the totality of a situation rather than parts of it), and the intuitor feels confident 
about their intuition (with no apparent reason in terms of evidence). Most authors also agree 
about strong relations to affect. However, there are still numerous studies being published on 
identifying and/or classifying types of intuition (e.g., Dane & Pratt, 2009; Dörfler & 
Ackermann, 2012; Gore & Sadler-Smith, 2011), which is why the conceptual debates still 
continue even if most authors agree that it is time to focus on empirical research (Sinclair & 
Coget, 2011). 
As with any other concept or ability or technique, intuition is not a µsuper-WRRO¶ for effective 
decisions and problem solving that is always applicable, in every situation, by everyone, and 
without constraints. Successful managers predominantly use their intuition when time is short, 
when there is no sufficient information for formal deliberate analysis and so forth (see, e.g., 
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Dane & Pratt, 2007; Sinclair & Ashkanasy, 2005). As may be expected, there are authors who 
argue for and against whether managers should use intuition. However, those who cite 
experimental evidence about the failure of intuition mostly study intuition of novices, while 
those who found intuition beneficial are focused on H[SHUWV¶LQWXLWLRQ (for more details, see 
Dörfler & Ackermann, 2012: 549±550). Currently, there seems to be considerable agreement 
that only the intuition of people with a high level of expertise, such as NLs, is worthy of trust 
(Hogarth, 2001; Kahneman & Klein, 2009; Prietula & Simon, 1989; Salas et al., 2010). 
 
INTUITION OF SCIENTISTS 
When examining the thinking process of philosophers, Bergson (1946) concluded that no 
complex thought can be arrived at other than by means of intuiting. He saw the role of intuition 
(Bergson, 1911: 238±239) as important for arriving at new ideas, after which we should 
abandon intuition and then work on building the body of knowledge using the new intuitively 
obtained knowledge. When ZHEHJLQWRµfeel lost¶, he argued that we should get in touch with 
our intuition again, often undoing what we have done in the deliberative phase, and continue 
this process in cycles. Thus, Bergson (1946: 33) argued for intuition as part of a method, 
particularly in areas of complex, dynamic and abstract thinking. Our findings provide 
significant support for this assertion; for the NLs we have investigated, no significant research 
result has been achieved without intuition playing a major part in the process. This result is 
also FRQVLVWHQWZLWK3RSSHU¶V(1968: 8) view that µthere is no such thing as a logical method of 
having ideas, or a logical reconstruction of this process « every discovery contains « ³a 
creative intuition´LQ%HUJVRQ¶VVHQVH¶. Bruner (1966: 2), who originally built up his reputation 
in mainstream psychology, arrived at a similar conclusion: µReaching for knowledge with the 
right hand is science. Yet to say only that much of science is to overlook one of its excitements, 
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for the great hypotheses of science are gifts carried in the left hand.¶ Furthermore, he 
emphasizes (Bruner, 1977: 67) that it is usually the most esteemed scientists who earn the label 
of µLQWXLWLYH¶ ZKLFK LQ LWVHOI LV VWURQJ HYLGHQFH WKDW VFLHQWLVWV ILQG LQWXLWLRQ YDOXDEOH This 
strong evidence for the use of intuition in research from the philosophy of science is further 
strengthened by numerous stories from the history of science (e.g., Beveridge, 1957; 
Hadamard, 1954; Hong, 2006b; Poincaré, 1914; Polányi & Prosch, 1977). 
Notably, in our research, we found no counter-examples where a NL denied using intuition 
or did not provide examples of intuition being used. Those who did not use the term intuition 
describe their work in terms remarkably similar to those we used to describe intuition above. 
Indeed, many of our interviewees preferred to avoid the term intuition in order to avoid the 
implication of lay and mystical explanations, but they did describe expert intuition at work (cf. 
µexperiential approach¶ by Klein & Weick, 2000). 7KH\RIWHQGHVFULEHGLWDVµMXVWNQRZLQJ¶
as Kenneth Arrow (NL in Economics 1972), talking about helping his disciples choose their 
research directions, commented: 
Well, of course obviously my job is to tell them « ,FDQVHHWKLVLVQ¶WJRLQJWRZRUN
HLWKHUEHFDXVHVRPHERG\HOVHKDVGRQHLWRUEHFDXVH,FDQMXVWVHHLWGRHVQ¶WZRUN. 
 
Similarly, Yoichiro Nambu (NL in Physics 2008) described intuition as a kind of intellectual 
feeling: 
6RPHWKLQJ WKDW¶VFOLFNHG LQP\PLQG WKDWVHHPV LQWHUHVWLQJRUVRPHWKLQJ WKDW¶V
PD\EHSURPLVLQJWKDW¶VDNLQGRIIHHOLQJ,KDYH 
 
James Cronin (NL in Physics 1980), when talking about how much he based his scientific 
problem solving on intuition, said: 
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[on using intuition in his research] Oh, I think quite a bit. ,GRQ¶WNQRZLILQWXition 
or «\RXEXLOGXSRYHUWKH\HDUVRIH[SHULHQFHDQG\RXNLQGRIKDYHDVHQVHRI
ZKDW¶VJRLQJWRZRUNDQGZKDW¶VQRWJRLQJWRZRUN Intuition, yeah, I guess so, but 
you know intuition again is one of these things a little bit hard to define exactly « 
. 
 
So, for these scientists, what we would call LQWXLWLRQLVWKHµELJOHDS¶WKDWWDNHVWKHPWRWKH 
start of the solution and the continued development of it. TKHµELJOHDS¶QRWLRQRILQWXLWLRQLV
not limited to scientists. Davenport and Prusak (2000: 11) use a very similar description in their 
popular book on knowledge management: µWe arrive at an answer intuitively, without knowing 
how we got there. That does not mean the steps to not exist ± intuition is not mystical. It means 
we have so thoroughly learned the steps that they happen automatically, without conscious 
thought, and therefore at great speed¶ (emphasis added). This resonates with *DXVV¶s account 
of a solution to a long-standing problem he obtained through intuitive insight (Hong, 2006a: 
144): µThe riddle solved itself as lightning strikes, and I myself could not tell or show the 
connection between what I knew before, what I last used to experiment with, and what 
produced the final success.¶More generally about his findings, he says (Polányi, 1962: 131): 
µI have had my solutions for a long time but I do not yet know how I am to arrive at them.¶ 
 
INTUITION IN MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION RESEARCH 
Thus, intuition is accepted as a valid contributor to the generation of knowledge by researchers 
in the field of science and also accepted as an integral part of being an effective manager. 
However, in management and organization research are we rejecting, or hiding, its role? In 
management and organization research Eisenhardt (1989: 532) has suggested that µframe 
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breaking insights, the testing of a good theory (e.g., parsimony, logical coherence), and 
convincing grounding in the evidence are key criteria for evaluating this type of research¶. 
Intuition is one way of providing the frame breaking insights. However, the role of intuition 
has been denied as being µat the heart of qualitative analysis for far too long¶ (Lee & Lings, 
2008: 252±253). Thomas (2004: 38) emphasizes that we only assume that intuition arises from 
unconscious processes, and if it yields insight we accept it as valuable. In comparison, Polányi 
(1962: 16) notes that the traditional conception of objective sciences µwould be shattered if the 
intuition of rationality in nature had to be acknowledged as a justifiable and indeed essential 
part of scientific theory¶. As Tsoukas (2005: 142) argues, we mistrust intuitive knowledge 
obtained through ad hoc or, at least, less defined practices in favour of explicit knowledge 
obtained through well-defined, if possible standardized, procedures. 
Management and organization research is not alone in this apparent negative approach to 
the role of a researcher¶s intuition. As Bruner (1977: 66) indicated: µone hears the most explicit 
talk about intuition in those fields where the formal apparatus of deduction and induction is 
most highly developed¶. If we assume that researchers in the area of management and 
organizations are similar to researchers in other fields, we must assume that the intuition-
analysis cycle is present in our research as well. However, as we suggest above, this is virtually 
never acknowledged explicitly. Perhaps we avoid reporting on the role of intuition because we 
are ashamed of its significance, perhaps because we do not allow for it to influence our 
research, perhaps because we expect it to be seen as improper ± untidy, unsystematic ± by our 
peers. If the role of intuition were discussed in papers submitted to top journals in the 
management and organizations field, then we expect that the papers would be rejected because 
of the declared difficulty of replication. 
If an intuitively obtained insight needs to be justified in, e.g., physics or chemistry, it can be 
expected that the analytical explanation is completely rigorous. In contrast, µmanagement 
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theories are more complex and, hence, more difficult to structure in a way that is scientifically 
testable with any degree of clarity¶ (Devinney & Siegel, 2012: 6), which may be another reason 
for not admitting intuition. This resonates with the argument put forward by Corley and Gioia 
(2011: 15) that business schools µbegan to emphasize more rigorous, quantitative orientations 
in an attempt to gain legitimacy within the larger academic community¶ and in doing so, we 
fail to generate theories that could µgenerally be seen as more interesting and, thus, more likely 
to make an impact on the reader¶. In any event, we may be discouragLQJWKHSRWHQWLDOIRUµELJ
leaps¶LQRXUUHVHDUFKE\not admitting it either in practice or in reporting our research. 
More generally, Einstein remarks that: µThe intuitive mind is a sacred gift and the rational 
mind is a faithful servant. We have created a society that honors the servant and has forgotten 
the gift¶ (quoted by Klein, 2004: 3). We are suggesting in this chapter that it is appropriate and 
helpful to use intuition, and to admit its role, and not forget the gift. 
 
7+((0(5*(17µ,178,7,9(¶0(7+2'2)7+(1OBEL LAUREATES PROJECT 
In our research on the cognitive complexity of NLs we did not decide in advance on the 
methods we intended to apply for the analysis of our interview data. We started the process of 
analysis by experimenting with alternative ways of making sense of the rich qualitative data 
obtained from the interviews. Gradually, µa method¶ started to emerge, which we believe has 
proved to be helpful in revealing some characteristics of the thinking of NLs. Among these 
characteristics was a dominance of intuitive thinking as being particularly salient. We see our 
method, which explicitly incorporates the intuition of the researcher, as a valid way of research 
trying to understand intuition better. 
The conceptual framework informing our empirical study of NLs is a model of knowledge 
levels (Dörfler et al., 2009). On the basis of this model, we became increasingly interested in 
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the cognitive complexity of people at the highest level of knowledge. The methodological 
approach that we adopted (Dörfler & Stierand, 2009) IRFXVHVRQWKHQRWLRQRIµHxWUDRUGLQDU\¶
people: those who are positive outliers of the population in terms of the phenomenon being 
investigated. This essentially means that we believe that we can learn the most about the 
development of new knowledge through examining people generally acknowledged to be at 
the highest level of research prowess, and NLs are arguably exemplars of this. Although there 
are undoubtedly a very large number of people as well as NLs who would be regarded as being 
at those levels, it did at least seem indisputable that NLs were at the top of their field. 
Investigating the extraordinary is not typical in academic research but it is also not without 
precedence, the most notable examples include Maslow (1970, 1971), Csíkszentmihályi (1997, 
2002) and Gardner (1993, 1995, 1997). We have also discussed our research project with the 
latter two researchers, and these discussions served for fine-tuning our approach. 
Csíkszentmihályi, for instance, claims that he spent years trying to apply various structured and 
semi-structured ways of analysing his 91 interviews with extraordinary creative people and he 
failed. Finally, he decided to simply write about what he learned during these interviews and 
provide examples ± which, finally, is the approach we chose to start with. 
In order to enable the collection of the richest data, we chose to use relatively unstructured 
interviews from the outset. Naturally, the earlier interviews inevitably informed the later ones, 
but we deliberately tried to keep the interviews as open as possible ± simply to have meaningful 
conversation with the interviewees on any topic they wanted to talk about with respect to their 
approach to research ± to let salient characteristics naturally emerge. We need to note here, that 
our approach is different from grounded theory (Glaser, 1992; Glaser & Strauss, 1967) as we 
did not aim for openness in the sense of starting with an µempty slate¶, but for a well-informed 
openness. The interviewer (Viktor) learned in advance as much as possible both about the 
research and personal histories of the interviewees. There are similarities to grounded theory 
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in terms of analysing the interviews, as we have been looking for emergent properties and tried 
be open-minded. However, the focus of the analysis, as we describe below, is the changed 
understanding of cognitive complexity ± which presupposes rather than denies/disregards 
previous knowledge. 
The average interview length was more than one hour and the 19 interviews resulted in 
around 400 pages of transcript and a few dozen pages of field notes. In addition, we researched 
the background of our interviewees from nearly 400 publicly available sources, including about 
20 hours of video material, adding over 300 pages of text. Simply looking at the large amount 
of text (transcripts and notes) was regarded as far too restrictive in comparison with the actual 
experience of the interviews (capturing the non-verbals and gestalt). Trying to preserve as 
much as possible of this richness, we started conversations between the two researchers (the 
interviewer ± Viktor ± and other ± Colin) trying to make sense of what we have learned about 
the cognitive complexity of NLs and the following process emerged. 
Unstructured Interviews on Unstructured Interviews  
Viktor conducted all the interviews and Colin, without reading the transcripts, started 
an interview-like process trying to figure out what sense Viktor made of the interviews. In the 
first two sessions (about 5 hours each) this was done in the form of free conversation, the focus 
was on the µbig picture¶ rather than the particular interviews and was largely driven by an 
exploration of what was surprising and interestingLQFOXGLQJµFULWLFDOLQFLGHQWV¶(Bryson et al., 
1996; Flanagan, 1954; Gremler, 2004). Typical questions were: µHow would you now argue 
that these interviews were with people at the highest level of expertise?¶ or µWhat do we learn 
from these interviews about difference between the highest and the penultimate levels of 
expertise? :KDWZRXOGEHWKHµEUHDN-SRLQW¶"¶These first two meetings resulted in a number of 
possible emergent themes as Colin sought to make sense of responses of 9LNWRU¶V reportage 
from a holistic stance. 
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Concept Mapping  
In the third and fourth sessions (over 6 hours each) Colin developed several concept 
maps (Bryson et al., 2004; Eden, 1992; Hodgkinson et al., 2004; Huff, 1990) about the issues 
that emerged in Viktor¶Vintuitive understanding of the highest level of knowledge using causal 
mapping software (Decision Explorer, DE2). These sessions resulted in several concept maps 
following the discussions from various perspectives. The maps were constructed interactively 
and in real time during the discussions. As the maps unfolded they were crudely analysed ± 
µVOLFLQJ¶WKHPDSVLQPDQ\GLIIHUHQWZD\VWRH[SORUHHPHUJHQWFOXVWHUVDQGVWUXFWXUHV (Eden, 
2004). These analyses were informed by the focal points from the first stage but did not strictly 
follow them, so additional themes emerged. 
Coding  
In the next stage the concepts and themes from the DE maps were transferred as nodes 
into NVivo.3 Here the process was similar to the typical use of NVivo, the difference being in 
the source of the coding nodes. The coding started using the concepts identified in the DE maps 
but the coding process was open, allowing for new nodes that emerged during the processing. 
Apart from a few examples, when some coding nodes have been already identified in the DE 
maps as variants or cases of a more general concept (e.g., four versions of the QRGHµmaster-
apprentice relationship¶), the nodes have not been structured. Thus, NVivo was used as a part 
of substantiating the emergent properties from the researcher discussions and the maps 
developed through them (in the same way, discussed above, that intuition guided deep analysis, 
and cycled back to intuition). 
Iterative Cycles  
                                                     
2. Decision Explorer is software designed to display and analyse concept/causal maps 
(http://www.banxia.com/dexplore/). 
3. NVivo is software designed to facilitate content analysis (http://www.qsrinternational.com/). 
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The cycle continued as newly emergent nodes were transferred from NVivo back to the 
previously created concept maps and new maps were created through the continual 
modification of the old maps. Here, through further interviews between the researchers, 
additional concepts emerged that were, in turn, added to NVivo again. Breaking up these 
µVKRUWHU¶F\FOHVIXUWKHUXQVWUXFWXUHGPHHWLQJVof the researchers were held, discussing various 
aspects of what had been learned from the interviews; these informed additional concept 
mapping and coding processes. An example would be the development of a perspective on 
what the management and organization research community can learn from the NLs (Dörfler 
& Eden, 2013). 
Mapping the Findings  
Using the different map views in DE was, of course, also useful for writing up the 
findings from various perspectives ± it made it possible to draw boundaries, and also develop 
links to the work of other researchers and writers. Another application of DE maps in this later 
stage was, for instance, to take a concept map created about the cognition of strategists and 
find similarities between their thinking and that of the NLs ± so we can see what the interviews 
with NLs can teach us about the manager as strategist. That way, for instance, we have found 
parallels between knowledge gained in strategy-making workshops and knowledge generated 
in hot spots of scientific research. 
As indicated earlier, the method above was not developed ex ante but emerged during the 
process of trying to understand what we have learned from the interviews. In the current 
research this method was not intended to be used specifically for investigating intuition but 
more generally for exploring the cognitive complexity of the interviewees. However, it seems 
likely that the same method would be applicable for research specifically aimed at intuition, 
and also to management and organization research in general; the fact that intuition emerged 
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When reporting on management and organizational research, and the methodology employed, 
we normally do not admit to intuition playing an important role. If we assume that management 
and organization researchers are similar to researchers in other fields, we must assume that the 
intuition-analysis cycle is, or should be, present in our research as well, and, indeed, might 
enhance it. However, the role of intuition, when used, is virtually never acknowledged 
explicitly, and intuition is unlikely to be discussed in research methodology programmes. 
Perhaps we undervalue the role of intuition in prosecuting good management and organization 
research. In this study we have presented a way of data processing that captures the richness of 
unstructured interviews and also allows for a formalised presentation that explicitly 
acknowledges intuition and its role in the research process rather than denying it. Using 
intuition and admitting that we do so could help in avoiding the darkest of Bergson¶V(1911: 
267) prophecies: µA different evolution might have led to a humanity either more intellectual 
still or more intuitive. In the humanity of which we are a part, intuition is, in fact, almost 




Agor, W. H. 1986. The logic of intuitive decision making: A research-based approach for top 
management. New York: Quorum Books. 
   14 
Akinci, C., & Sadler-Smith, E. 2012. Intuition in management research: A historical review. 
International Journal of Management Reviews, 14(1): 104±122. 
Barnard, C. I. 1938. The functions of the executive. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Behling, O., & Eckel, N. L. 1991. Making sense out of intuition. The Academy of Management 
Executive, 5(1): 46±54. 
Bergson, H. 1911. Creative evolution. New York: Henry Holt and Company. 
Bergson, H. 1946. The creative mind: An introduction to metaphysics. New York: Citadel 
Press. 
Beveridge, W. I. B. 1957. The art of scientific investigation, 2nd edn. Caldwell, NJ: Blackburn 
Press. 
Bruner, J. S. 1966. On knowing: Essays for the left hand. New York: Atheneum. 
Bruner, J. S. 1977. The process of education, 2nd edn. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Bryson, J. M., Ackermann, F., Eden, C., & Finn, C. B. 1996. Critical incidents and emergent 
issues in the management of large scale change effects. In D. F. Kettl, & H. B. Milward 
(Eds.), The state of public management: 267±285. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
Bryson, J. M., Ackermann, F., Eden, C., & Finn, C. B. 2004. Visible thinking: Unlocking causal 
mapping for practical business results. Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons. 
Corley, K. G., & Gioia, D. A. 2011. Building theory about theory building: What constitutes a 
theoretical contribution? Academy of Management Review, 36(1): 12±32. 
Csíkszentmihályi, M. 1997. Creativity: Flow and the psychology of discovery and invention. 
New York: HarperCollins. 
   15 
Csíkszentmihályi, M. 2002. Flow: The psychology of optimal experience, 2nd edn. London: 
Rider. 
Dane, E., & Pratt, M. G. 2007. Exploring intuition and its role in managerial decision making. 
Academy of Management Review, 32(1): 33±54. 
Dane, E., & Pratt, M. G. 2009. Conceptualizing and measuring intuition: A review of recent 
trends. In G. P. Hodgkinson, & J. K. Ford (Eds.), International Review of Industrial 
and Organizational Psychology, Vol. 24: 1±40. Chichester, UK: Wiley. 
Davenport, T. H., & Prusak, L. 2000. Working knowledge: How organizations manage what 
they know, paperback edn. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. 
Dean, D., & Mihalasky, J. 1974. Executive ESP. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Devinney, T. M., & Siegel, D. S. 2012. Perspectives on the art and science of management 
scholarship. Academy of Management Perspectives, 26(1): 6±11. 
Dörfler, V., & Ackermann, F. 2012. Understanding intuition: The case for two forms of 
intuition. Management Learning, 43(5): 545±564. 
Dörfler, V., & Eden, C. 2013. Nobel Laureates: Implications for management and organization 
research. Paper presented at AoM 2013, the Seventy-third Annual Meeting of the 
Academy of Management, Lake Buena Vista, Orlando, Florida. 
Dörfler, V., & Stierand, M. 2009. Investigating the extraordinary. Paper presented at BAM 
2009, the Twenty-third Annual Conference of the British Academy of Management, 
Brighton, UK. 
Dörfler, V., Baracskai, Z., & Velencei, J. 2009. Knowledge levels: 3-D model of the levels of 
expertise. Paper presented at AoM 2009, the Sixty-ninth Annual Meeting of the 
Academy of Management, Chicago. 
   16 
Eden, C. 1992. On the nature of cognitive maps. Journal of Management Studies, 29(3): 261±
265. 
Eden, C. 2004. Analyzing cognitive maps to help structure issues or problems. European 
Journal of Operational Research, 159(3): 673±686. 
Eisenhardt, K. M. 1989. Building theories from case study research. Academy of Management 
Review, 14(4): 532±550. 
Flanagan, J. C. 1954. The critical incident technique. Psychological Bulletin, 51(4): 327±358. 
Ford, C. H. 1977. The µelite¶ decision-makers: What makes them tick? Human Resource 
Management, 16(4): 14±20. 
Gardner, H. 1993. Creating minds: An anatomy of creativity seen through the lives of Freud, 
Einstein, Picasso, Stravinsky, Eliot, Graham, and Gandhi. New York: Basic Books. 
Gardner, H. 1995. Leading minds: An anatomy of leadership. London: HarperCollins. 
Gardner, H. 1997. Extraordinary minds: Portraits of exceptional individuals and an 
examination of our extraordinariness. London: Phoenix. 
Glaser, B. G. 1992. Basics of grounded theory analysis: Emergence vs forcing. Mill Valley, 
CA: Sociology Press. 
Glaser, B. G., & Strauss, A. L. 1967. The discovery of grounded theory: Strategies for 
qualitative research. Chicago: Aldine Publishers. 
Gore, J., & Sadler-Smith, E. 2011. Unpacking intuition: A process and outcome framework. 
Review of General Psychology, 15(4): 304±316. 
Gremler, D. D. 2004. The critical incident technique in service research. Journal of Service 
Research, 7(1): 65±89. 
   17 
Hadamard, J. 1954. The psychology of invention in the mathematical field. New York: Dover 
Publications. 
Hodgkinson, G. P., Maule, A. J., & Bown, N. J. 2004. Causal cognitive mapping in the 
organizational strategy field: A comparison of alternative elicitation procedures. 
Organizational Research Methods, 7(1): 3±26. 
Hodgkinson, G. P., Langan-Fox, J., & Sadler-Smith, E. 2008. Intuition: A fundamental 
bridging construct in the behavioural sciences. British Journal of Psychology, 99(1): 1±
27. 
Hodgkinson, G. P., Sadler-Smith, E., Sinclair, M., & Ashkanasy, N. M. 2009. More than meets 
the eye? Intuition and analysis revisited. Personality and Individual Differences, 47(4): 
342±346. 
Hogarth, R. M. 2001. Educating intuition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
+RQJ)D7KHHQLJPDRIKXPDQFUHDWLYLW\+LGGHQPHVVDJHVIURP1LNROD7HVOD¶V0RML
3URQDODVFL,Q5-+DODãL, I. P. ûRVLü, 	7-+DODãL(GV1Dã7HVOD(Our Tesla), 
Technical Science Monograph No. 18: 127±176. Novi Sad, Serbia: Faculty of 
Technical Science, University of Novi Sad and Society for the Promotion of Science 
Novi Sad. 
Hong, F. 2006b. Tesla composed like Mozart, Celebration of the 150th anniversary of the birth 
of Nikola Tesla. Belgrade, Serbia: Department of Machine Engineering, Faculty of 
Engineering, University of Belgrade. 
Huff, A. S. 1990. Mapping strategic thought. New York: Wiley. 
Isaack, T. S. 1978. Intuition: An ignored dimension of management. Academy of Management 
Review, 3(4): 917±922. 
   18 
Isenberg, D. J. 1984. How senior managers think. Harvard Business Review, 62(6): 81±90. 
Kahneman, D. 2003. A perspective on judgment and choice: Mapping bounded rationality. 
American Psychologist, 58(9): 697±720. 
Kahneman, D., & Klein, G. 2009. Conditions for intuitive expertise: A failure to disagree. 
American Psychologist, 64(6): 515±526. 
Klein, G. 2004. The power of intuition: How to use your gut feelings to make better decisions 
at work, paperback edn. New York: Doubleday Currency. 
Klein, G., & Weick, K. E. 2000. Decisions: Making the right ones. Learning from the wrong 
ones. Across the Board, 37(6): 16±22. 
Leavitt, H. J. 1975. Beyond the analytic manager (Part II). California Management Review, 
17(4): 11±21. 
Lee, N. J., & Lings, I. 2008. Doing business research: A guide to theory and practice. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Maslow, A. H. 1970. Religions, values, and peak-experiences. New York: Penguin. 
Maslow, A. H. 1971. The farther reaches of human nature. London: Penguin Compass. 
Mintzberg, H. 1976. Planning on the left side and managing on the right. Harvard Business 
Review, 54(July±August): 49±57. 
Osbeck, L. M. 2001. Direct apprehension and social construction: Revisiting the concept of 
intuition. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 21(2): 118±131. 
Peters, T. J., & Waterman, R. H. J. 1982. In search of excellence: Lessons from America's best-
run companies. London: Profile Books. 
Poincaré, H. 1914. Science and method. London: Thomas Nelson and Sons. 
   19 
Polányi, M. 1962. Personal knowledge: Towards a post-critical philosophy. London: 
Routledge. 
Polányi, M., & Prosch, H. 1977. Meaning, paperback edn. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Popper, K. R. 1968. The logic of scientific discovery, 2nd edn. London: Routledge. 
Prietula, M. J., & Simon, H. A. 1989. The experts in your midst. Harvard Business Review, 
67(January±February): 120±124. 
Sadler-Smith, E. 2008. Inside intuition. London: Routledge. 
Salas, E., Rosen, M. A., & DiazGranados, D. 2010. Expertise-based intuition and decision 
making in organizations. Journal of Management, 36(4): 941±973. 
Simon, H. A. 1987. Making management decisions: The role of intuition and emotion. The 
Academy of Management Executive, 1(1): 57±64. 
Sinclair, M. 2011. An integrated framework of intuition. In M. Sinclair (Ed.), Handbook of 
intuition research: 3±16. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar. 
Sinclair, M., & Ashkanasy, N. M. 2005. Intuition: Myth or a decision-making tool? 
Management Learning, 36(3): 353±370. 
Sinclair, M., & Coget, J.-F. 2011. Intuition in organizations. Symposium organized at AoM 
2011, the Seventy-first Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, San Antonio, 
Texas. 
Thomas, A. B. 2004. Research skills for management studies. London: Routledge. 
Tsoukas, H. 2005. Complex knowledge: Studies in organizational epistemology. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Vaughan, F. E. 1979. Awakening intuition. New York: Anchor Books. 
